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Abstract 
This study appraised the preparedness of  Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) towards the adoption of a common currency by analysing the degree of 
symmetry and sizes of identified shocks across member countries. The analysis was 
situated within the framework of the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) theory and the 
structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model was employed on secondary data from 
1975 to 2015. The findings reveal that external supply shocks across ECOWAS 
countries are symmetric except for Sierra Leone, while demand, supply and monetary 
shocks among member countries are asymmetric. The absolute relative sizes of the 
different shocks across member countries are high and different in sizes. This implies 
that ECOWAS countries are not fully prepared to adopt a common currency and the 
fixed exchange rate as a stabilization policy for the entire West Africa. Hence 
ECOWAS governments should further shift the targeted date beyond 2020 to create 
ample time for member countries to get fully prepared. 
Keywords:  monetary union, optimal currency area, symmetry of shocks, structure VAR, 
ECOWAS 
JEL classification: F36, F42, E52, R11 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The desire to strengthen economic integration and regional stability has 
motivated economic blocs across the World to assess the possibilities of establishing a 
common market and introducing a common currency that will facilitate economic 
transactions. This is achievable only if a group of countries are willing to sacrifice their 
monetary autonomy and implement a common stabilization policy.  
Inspired by the benefits of a monetary union, the ECOWAS Heads of States 
adopted a two-track approach to set up a common Central Bank for the entire region 
with the introduction of a common currency. The creation of a second monetary union 
called the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ- Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, 
Liberia and Sierra Leone) in 2003 was considered as the first tract, while the rebirth of a 
broader monetary union that will merge the existing West African Economic and 
Monetary Union (WAEMU- Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d‟Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal 
and Togo) and the newly created WAMZ is considered as the second track. 
The standard framework that examines the desirability of a monetary union is 
premised on the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) theory introduced by Mundell (1961), 
extended by McKinnon (1963) and further enriched by Kenen (1969) and Ishiyama 
(1975) emphasizes on the symmetry of shocks that resonate across a group of countries 
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contemplating to form a monetary union. Symmetric shocks are crucial because they 
provide information on the costs and desirability of a union‟s monetary policy 
(Tsangarides & Qureshi, 2008; Karras, 2006; De Grauwe, 2005). Thus, countries that 
exhibit high co-movements in their economic activities can proceed to a monetary union 
because they are likely to experience similar economic shocks with less cost.  
Even though the key issues enshrined in the OCA theory among other strategies 
have been frequently discussed by ECOWAS governments and ratified in the various 
Treaties, member countries still remain vulnerable to high asymmetric shocks. 
Tsangarides & Qureshi, (2008) and Karras, (2006) observed that the shocks that 
resonate across ECOWAS countries are uncorrelated implying that the adoption of a 
common stabilization policy will be costly for member countries. The asymmetry of 
shocks across ECOWAS is due partly to the differentials in their major exports. IMF 
Report (2007) reveals that Nigeria is the largest Country and the greatest oil exporter in 
the region while prospective union members‟ international trade is heavily skewed 
towards commodity exports, thus making the terms of trade shocks highly uncorrelated 
across the region. 
The vulnerability to asymmetric external and domestic shocks in the entire 
region portents a high cost of forfeiting monetary autonomy by member countries to a 
common Central bank, yet ECOWAS countries have expressed  their desire to  
introduce a common currency for the entire region by the year 2020. Therefore, the 
main objective of this study is to appraise the preparedness of ECOWAS towards the 
adoption of a common currency for West Africa.  
The structure of the study is as follows: Section 1 ushers in the introduction; 
Section 2 discusses the theoretical underpinnings as well as the empirical literature. 
Section 3 presents the methodology and sources of data. Section 4 presents the results 
and analysis, while the conclusion and recommendations are contained in Section 5. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Theoretical framework 
The discourse on the costs and benefits of establishing a monetary union is 
rooted in the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) theory introduced in the early 1960s by 
Robert Mundel and further enriched by McKinnon (1963), Kenen (1969) and Ishiyama 
(1975). The theory proceeded from the debate on the importance of ﬁxed versus ﬂexible 
exchange rate regimes and was also motivated by the malfunctioning of the Bretton 
Woods System of ﬁxed exchange rates. While Friedman (1953) emphasizes on the 
relative importance of the floating regime as a basic condition for free trade because it 
has the ability to ease the process of adjustment to external shocks, Krugman (1990) 
rather submits that the fixed exchange rate regime confers a degree of stability between 
the participants and the numéraire country (countries), as well as between the 
participants. Proponents of the OCA theory go beyond the two contending views, 
stating clearly the conditions that must be fulfilled by countries wishing to form a 
monetary union.  
An important perquisite entry condition for an optimum currency area according 
to Robert Mundell is that member countries should allow the „free movement of factors 
of production‟ (i.e. labour, wages, or capital) across the region. Mundell‟s (1961) 
submission underscores the appropriateness of a common currency predicated on the 
symmetry of both supply and demand shocks in a regional bloc. Thus, mobility of 
factors of production balances the surpluses and deficits of member countries (Alturki, 
2007) and automatically stabilizes asymmetric shocks (Kochanová, 2008). In 1973, 
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Robert Mundell complimented his earlier proposition, acknowledging that candidates 
for a monetary union should also promote „portfolio diversification‟ for international 
risk sharing. The simple reasoning here is that countries are not hit by severe 
asymmetric shocks when they share portfolio diversification in capital markets (Ling, 
2001) since financial capital moves much more easily than physical capital and labour 
(Broz, 2005 and McKinnon, 2004). 
Extending the OCA theory, McKinnnon (1963) propounded that „trade 
openness‟ is a decisive criterion for a monetary union and not factor mobility as initially 
proposed by Mundel (1961). Robert McKinnon argued that economies are more likely 
to adopt a fixed exchange system, the moment they become more open to one another. 
An important criterion that adds credence to the OCA theory is a country‟s 
„diversification of production‟ propounded by Kenen (1969). More diversified 
economies according to Kenen, are less prone to different types of shocks; provide more 
job opportunities and posses a high candidacy level for a monetary union. 
Consequently, diversification of production in a regional bloc can maintain internal 
stability of prices; thus, omitting the need of exchange rate as an adjustment 
mechanism. Kenen also underscores the need for a well coordinated fiscal and monetary 
policy in guaranteeing the success of monetary integration. Sheik‟s (2014) supporting 
Kenen‟s view submits that fiscal policy integration would allow countries of a monetary 
union to redistribute funds to a member country affected by an adverse country-specific 
disturbance thereby guaranteeing the stability of the monetary union. Ishiyama‟s (1975) 
contribution to the OCA theory cited in Broz (2005) suggests that candidate countries of 
common currency should possess “inflation and wage stability” as this would signal 
similarities in economic structure and policies. These similarities foster a more balanced 
current account and trade among member countries, and therefore curbs the need for 
nominal exchange rate adjustment (Mougani, 2014). 
The key criteria for an optimum currency area advanced by Mundell (1961), 
McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969) are factor mobility, trade openness, product 
diversification and similarity of inflation rates and wage stability. However, Krugman 
(1993) and Mongelli‟s (2002) Tavlas (1993), Tavlas (2009), Dellas and Tavlas (2009) 
submit that a successful monetary integration is incumbent on the “political will and 
interregional compensation” schemes of member countries.  
Analyzing the preparedness of ECOWAS towards a common currency is 
situated within the framework of the Optimum Currency Area theory because key issues 
ratified in various ECOWAS Treaties are enshrined in optimum currency area theory.  
Empirical literature review 
A plethora of studies have evaluated the viability of a currency union by 
identifying the degree of symmetry of shocks among a group of economies using the 
structural vector auto regressive (SVAR) approach, introduced by Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1992), premised on the Blanchard-Quah decomposition of shocks 
between supply side and demand side to operationalize the optimum currency area 
theory.  
Based on the Blanchard-Quah framework, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992) 
explored the size of shocks and the speed of adjustment to these shocks to the results 
from US annual regional data from 1970 to 2008. They found that the underlying 
shocks are significantly more idiosyncratic across EC countries than across US regions, 
In another related study, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) found that currency unions 
were feasible among clusters of regional blocs in East Asia countries, Western 
 128 
 
               Jurnal Perspektif Pembiayaan dan Pembangunan Daerah Vol. 6. No. 1, July – Augustus  2018.   ISSN: 2338-4603 (print); 2355-8520 (online) 
 
European countries, Latin American countries and North American countries including 
Canada and United States. Many studies across Europe have produced similar results 
using the SVAR: Ramos and Suriach (2004); Frenkel and Nickel (2002); Broz (2008) 
and Marinas (2012). Ramos and Suriach (2004) showed that shocks are more 
asymmetric in candidate countries than in current Euro-zone members. Similarly, 
Horvath and Rátfai (2004) showed that the shocks of EMU members and candidate 
countries wishing to join the EMU were   idiosyncratic, implying that the enlargement 
of the EMU will require a costly process. 
Many studies have ex-rayed the feasibility of the Asian and Latin American 
monetary unions by evaluating the degree of symmetry in macroeconomic disturbances 
of member countries predicated on the Blanchard and Quah methodology.  Almost all 
the studies are unique in their conclusion suggesting that shocks among member 
countries were asymmetric. For instance, Sato, Zhang and McAlee (2005), Koh and Lee 
(2010); Ling (2001); Tang, (2006); Jeon and Zhang (2007); Huang and Guo (2006) 
using the SVAR, reached the conclusion that a fully-fledged currency union in the 
Asian region is not necessary but rather smaller sub-groupings could possibly form a 
monetary union. The strand of literature on Latin American (LM): Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1994), Licandro (2000), Hallwood, Marsh and Scheibe (2006), Foresti 
(2007), McKnight and Sánchez (2014) among others havee a unique conclusion - the 
formation of a LM monetary union is not feasible. 
Literature on the feasibility of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) monetary 
union using the AD-AS framework is vast. Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn (2008) found that 
GCC demand shocks were asymmetric implying that they were not good candidates for 
a successful monetary union. Al-Turki (2007), Benbouziane, Benhabbib, and Benamaar 
(2010), Louis, Balli and Osman (2010) among others Alshehry and Slimane (2012), 
Kandil and Trabelsi (2012) and Arfa (2012), also reach a similar conclusion. 
Studies in Africa that have used the AD-AS framework to analyse the viability 
of a monetary union among different regional sub groupings have little nuances. Buigut 
and Valev (2005) established that economic shocks of SADC economies were not 
highly correlated across the entire region, hence they may benefit from a currency 
union. Njoroge, Opolot, Abuka and Okello (2011) submitted that a monetary union for 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) was possible but might 
however make member countries more vulnerable to shocks, thereby limiting the 
potential benefits of monetary integration. Sheikh, Zarina and Aslam (2013) and 
Mafusire and Brixiova (2013) in their studies concluded that macroeconomic 
convergence was impossible for EAC countries.  
Few studies have analysed the degree of symmetry of shocks across West 
African States using the SVAR mode. Addison, Opoku-Afari and Kinful (2005) found 
very low cross country correlations of terms of trade shocks and real exchange rate 
shocks across WAMZ countries. Unlike Addison et al. (2005) who used the typical 
Blanchard and Quah (1989) model, Chuku (2012) and Onye et al. (2012) in separate 
studies extended the previous model to a four-shock VAR model for ECOWAS. Their 
results are consistent showing that the relative responses of the economies to external 
disturbances are highly asymmetric as well as the correlations of supply, demand and 
monetary shocks among the countries. They suggested that for main time, ECOWAS 
should not proceed with the eco, since the costs will outweigh the benefits. Their results 
agree with an earlier finding by Houssa (2008) who used a dynamic factor model  
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METHODOLOGY 
Source of data 
The data sets for the analysis are extracted from various issues of the 
International Financial Statistics published by the IMF, World Development Indicators 
published by World Bank and WAMA indicators published by the West African 
Monetary Agency. The study covered the period 1975 to 2015 to considerably take into 
account all the protocols and agreements meted out by ECOWAS and also, to fully 
capture the behaviour of the macroeconomic variables with respect to the convergence 
criteria. The variables used in the study are: World oil prices (WOP) global GDP 
(GGDP), real gross domestic product (RGDP), real effective exchange rate (REER) and 
domestic prices proxied by inflation (INF). Annual data for 14 ECOWAS economies, 
namely Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d‟Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. Liberia was not 
considered due to paucity of data.  
Model specification 
The study employed the SVAR premised on Blanchard and Quah (1998) AD-AS 
framework extends the 2-variable VAR and 4-variable VAR model used in the literature 
to a 5-variable VAR model to examine the degree of symmetry and/or asymmetry of 
macroeconomic shocks among ECOWAS economies. Based on this analytical 
framework, countries will adopt a common currency if the shocks affecting the 
participating economies are positively correlated (symmetric) and vice versa.  
The structural model is decomposed by specifying the five shocks world oil price 
(WOP), global GDP (GGDP), domestic real GDP (DRGDP), real effective exchange 
rate (REER) and inflation (INF), as follows: 
         ( )  
                                 ( ) 
          ( )  
      ( )  
                        ( ) 
           ( )  
      ( )  
      ( )  
                ( ) 
          ( )  
      ( )  
      ( )  
     ( )  
              ( ) 
         ( )  
      ( )  
      ( )  
     ( )  
     ( )  
       ( ) 
The 5x5 matrix (Ai) provides the impulse responses of endogenous variables to 
structural shocks. ϵ = [  WOP,   GGDP,   DRGDP,   REER,   INF], comprising of 
external world supply shock (  WOP,   GGDP) domestic supply shock (  DRGDP), 
domestic demand shock (  REER), and monetary shock   INF), respectively and are 
assumed to be serially uncorrelated. The long run restrictions are as follows:  
World oil price is considered to be strictly exogenously, implying that A11(L) ≠ 
0, while A12(L) = A13(L)  = A14(L) = A15(L) = 0. Global real GDP strictly evolves 
exogenously implying that A21(L) ≠ 0 and A22(L) ≠ 0, while A23(L) = A24 (L)= A25(L) =0.  
Domestic real GDP is affected exclusively by supply shocks in world oil prices 
and global real GDP. Thus, A31(L) ≠0, A32(L) ≠ 0, A33(L) ≠ 0, while A34(L) = A35(L)= 0.  
Real effective exchange rate is assumed to be affected only by shocks from the 
world oil price, global output, domestic supply shocks and domestic demand shocks, 
A41(L) ≠0, A42(L)  ≠ 0, A43(L)  ≠ 0, A44 (L) ≠ 0, while A45(L)  = 0. 
 Lastly, domestic price is assumed to be strictly endogenous, meaning that prices 
are affected by shocks from the world oil price, in global GDP, domestic supply, 
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demand shocks as well as monetary shocks. Thus, A51(L) ≠0, A52(L)  ≠ 0, A53(L)  ≠ 0, 
A54 (L) ≠ 0 and A55(L)  = 0. 
The new decomposed model with restrictions can be represented in the matrix 
form: 
[
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            ( ) 
The long run restrictions have been imposed to identify the structural underlying 
shocks. World oil prices (WOP) and global GDP are exogenous to country-specific 
domestic shocks, while all domestic variables are affected by shocks in world oil prices 
and global GDP.  
 
PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
Before implementing the multivariate SVAR model, the variables were screened 
in order to avoid spurious regression and ascertain the order of integration (stationarity) 
of the series by employing the Augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF), Phillips Perron tests 
and the correlogram approach
1
 (Appendix 1). The results indicate that the variables of 
all the countries except Seirra Leone and Senegal have unit roots at levels. But after 
differencing the series once, all the variables became stationary at various levels of 
significance. Both ADF and PP tests provide conflicting results for the global GDP of 
Sierra Leone and domestic price for Senegal. However, this was settled with the use of 
spectra analysis which shows that both variables are integrated of order one. All the 
results satisfy the diagnostic tests. 
Diagnostic tests 
Appendix 2 shows the optimal lag lengths and serial correlation LM tests for the 
different VAR models. The different optimal lag lengths were chosen in order to ensure 
that the estimations of the structural VAR are consistent. The result reveals that only the 
VAR estimates of Benin, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Togo are in conformity with the 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Swartz Information Criterion (SIC) lag 
selection criteria. The estimated SVAR models for the rest of the countries exhibited 
serial correlation at their original lags and thus, the appropriate lag lengths were 
selected based on the absence of the serial correlation test as indicated on Table 2 The 
results of the serial correlation LM tests indicate that all the models at the chosen lags 
are free from serial correlation because the p-values in the brackets are greater than 
0.05. Hence, the models are robust at their chosen lags.  
Stability test 
The next important test that follows the serial correlation LM-test is the VAR 
stability test. The estimated VAR model is stable (stationary) if all roots have modulus 
                                                          
1 ADF test:                ∑      
 
      : ΔXt is the first difference of the series X, k is the lag 
order, t is the time. 
PP test:                  (  
 
 
)      a, b, and c are the coefficients and T is the total number of 
observations. Therefore, the ADF and PP unit root tests posits a null hypothesis   = 0 versus an 
alternative hypothesis  < 0, where the ADF and PP statistics is compared with the observed Mackinnon 
critical values.  
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less than one and lie inside the unit circle (Agung, 2009). Certain results (such as 
impulse response standard errors) are not valid if the VAR is not stable, (Eviews Help 
Menu, version 9.5).  
Appendix 3 presents the VAR stability test for ECOWAS in the study sample. 
The results show that all the roots of the VAR model have a modulus less than one. 
Thus, the estimated VAR models of all the ECOWAS countries under consideration 
fulfil the stability condition. All initial preliminary VAR diagnostics have been fulfilled 
which permits the study to proceed with further analyses. 
Identification and correlation of structural shocks  
The traditional OCA theory lays emphasis on the importance of symmetric 
shocks for countries contemplating to form a monetary. The decision criterion is that a 
positive and significant correlation indicates that the shocks are symmetric, while 
negative or not statistically significant implies that the shocks are asymmetric. The 
results of the correlations of both external and domestic supply shocks, demand and 
monetary shocks among the ECOWAS economies are analysed in the following 
subsections. 
Correlation of external supply shocks  
World oil price 
Appendix 4 presents the correlation coefficients of supply shocks across 
ECOWAS countries, with respect to world oil prices from 1975-2015. The results 
indicate that the correlations of external supply shocks are positive and highly 
significant for all ECOWAS countries. This implies that all ECOWAS countries 
respond to changes in World oil prices in almost the same manner (symmetric). The 
reason for the  high correlation is because the price of oil in the world market affects the 
economies of all countries in the ECOWAS region irrespective of whether they are oil 
producing countries or not. Thus, higher correlation of shocks from world oil prices will 
increase the benefits of forming a monetary union by ECOWAS countries. 
Global Gross Domestic Product 
Appendix 5 presents the correlation coefficients of external supply shocks across 
ECOWAS countries, with respect to global GDP from 1975-2015. The results indicate 
that the correlations of external supply shocks are positive and significant across 
ECOWAS countries except for few pairs of countries: Guinea Bissau-Cape Verde; 
Nigeria-Cape Verde, Senegal-Cape Verde; Senegal- Gambia; Togo-Nigeria; Togo-
Senegal. The positive correlations of external shocks across ECOWAS countries show 
that their economies‟ respond to global shock is similar. Chuku (2012) attributes this 
similarity in shocks to the primary export-oriented structure of most West African 
economies. Thus, higher correlations from an external source suggest more benefits to 
ECOWAS countries because the adoption of a common currency will greatly reduce 
bilateral exchange rate distortions brought about by external disturbances. However, the 
correlations coefficients of Sierra Leone are negative. This implies that Sierra Leone‟s 
response to global shocks is asymmetric to other ECOWAS countries. 
External sources of disturbance greatly affect ECOWAS countries. That 
notwithstanding, the response to these disturbances in the region are similar, but for 
Sierra Leone that displays a different response pattern with respect to global GDP. The 
implication is that Sierra Leone may be worse-off in a monetary union based on these 
criteria.  
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Correlation of domestic supply shocks (Domestic real GDP (DGDP) 
Appendix 6 presents the correlation coefficients of domestic supply shocks 
across ECOWAS. Among the pairs of countries studied, 17 pairs have insignificant 
correlation coefficients while 17 pairs have negative coefficients, making a total of 34 
pairs of countries that have uncorrelated domestic supply shocks. This implies that 
domestic supply shocks across ECOWAS countries are largely asymmetric. The degree 
of asymmetry is justified because of the differences in the core primary export 
commodities among ECOWAS countries. However, the remaining 57 pairs of countries 
display positive and significant correlations. In a nut shell, ECOWAS countries exhibit 
different responses to domestic supply shocks and therefore, require different 
adjustment policies.  
Domestic demand shocks 
Appendix 7 provides the correlation coefficients of demand shocks among 
ECOWAS countries. The responses to demand shocks across ECOWAS countries are 
different because out of the 91 pairs of countries examined, only 38 have significant 
symmetric correlations in domestic demand shocks, while the rest display asymmetric 
responses. The results are similar to the findings of Fielding and Shield (2001) for the 
CFA zone. Chuku (2012) attributed the prevalence of asymmetric correlation in demand 
shocks to the weak inter-demand relationships among ECOWAS economies. 
Monetary shocks 
Appendix 8 shows the correlation results of monetary shocks among ECOWAS 
countries. Out of the 91 pairs of countries investigated, only 25 pairs of the countries 
have symmetric correlations in monetary shocks. The symmetry of monetary shocks is 
significant among WAEMU countries, whereas WAMZ countries have an asymmetric 
correlation of monetary shocks. The symmetry of monetary shocks among the WAEMU 
countries is due to the fact they belong to an already existing monetary. Hence, the 
response to a common monetary policy is likely to be similar. The other 66 pairs of 
ECOWAS countries either display negative or insignificant correlations between 
monetary shocks; implying that the potentials for symmetric adjustments within the 
context of a monetary union may not feasible.  
Homogeneity of shocks  
A one-way ANOVA analysis is used to categorize the nature of the shocks 
(symmetric/asymmetric) across ECOWAS countries. It is informative to know whether 
these shocks are heterogeneous (implying that forming a monetary union is costly) or 
homogeneous (implying that implying that forming a monetary union is costly). The 
basic idea is that if the identified shocks among ECOWAS countries have the same 
mean, then the shocks are homogeneous, otherwise heterogeneous. Secondly, it is 
important to measure the extent of volatility of supply and demand shocks because of 
policy stabilization. This is because smaller shocks imply less reliance to stabilization 
policies such as nominal exchange rate adjustments thereby making regional economies 
better candidates for a monetary union (Sheik, 2012). The size of the shock is measured 
using the coefficient of variation (CV). A CV value of less than one implies 
homogeneity among sub groups, whereas a CV value of more than 1 signifies 
heterogeneity among sub groups suggesting that the degree of variability among them is 
wide (Fischer, 2000; Palmer & Reid, 2001). 
Table 1 shows a summary result of both the one-way ANOVA test and 
coefficient of variance test.  
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Table 1. One-way ANOVA test and Coefficient of Variance 
Source of Disturbance 
One-way  ANOVA  
(F-test) 
Coefficient of Variance 
(Levene-test) 
Value p-value Value p-value 
World Oil Price Shock 39.48 0.0000 4.33 0.0000 
Global GDP Shock 70.74 0.0000 3.22 0.0003 
Domestic Supply Shock 118.8 0.0000 3.02 0.0007 
Demand Shock 43.83 0.0000 6.8 0.0000 
Monetary Shock 103.46 0.0000 7.4 0.0000 
The probability values are zero, implying that the means of the supply, demand 
and monetary shocks differ across ECOWAS countries. Hence, the identified shocks are 
heterogeneous. Furthermore, the CV values are greater than 1 with the monetary shock 
having a relatively higher degree of variation from other shocks. This implies that 
policy responses will be different across ECOWAS countries; hence, the formation a 
monetary union in the region will be costly. 
Size of identified shocks 
Table 2 reports the absolute average sizes of both external and domestic shocks 
across ECOWAS economies. The different relative sizes of the shocks indicate whether 
the different stabilization policies will be synchronous or whether a common 
stabilization will address different macroeconomic disturbances across West Africa. 
This implies that a common stabilization policy will be rendered ineffective if the 
identified shocks are larger. The impulse response coefficients are used to evaluate the 
size of the shocks since it traces the effect of a one-unit shock in each of the five 
endogenous variables. 
Table 2. Size of external and internal shocks (*100) 
 
Among the various economies, Benin, Mali, Niger and Niger have the smallest 
size of supply shocks at 0.18%, 0.23% and 0.28% respectively, while Guinea, Nigeria, 
Togo and Sierra Leone have the largest sizes of 1.26%, 1.56, 0.96 and 0.89% 
respectively. For the average demand shocks, Togo, Senegal, Guinea Bissau and Sierra 
Leone have the largest sizes of 27.68%, 26.9%, 18.55 and 12.1%, while Nigeria, 
Gambia and Guinea have the smallest sizes of 0.23%, 0.48% and 0.62% respectively. 
On average, the size of monetary shock is high for Guinea Bissau (22.29%), Burkina 
Faso (22.96%), Senegal (12.36%) and Cape Verde (14.18%) respectively, while 
Country 
External 
Supply Shock 
(WOP) 
External 
Supply Shock 
(GGDP) 
Domestic 
Supply Shock 
Average 
Supply 
Shock 
Demand 
Shock 
Monetary 
Shock 
Benin 0.0011 0.0001 0.0006 0.0018 0.0266 0.1355 
Burkina Faso 0.0003 0.0011 0.0040 0.0053 0.0478 0.2296 
Cape Verde 0.0020 0.0006 0.0004 0.0030 0.0468 0.1418 
Cote D'Ivoire 0.0012 0.0021 0.0027 0.0060 0.0939 0.0807 
Gambia 0.0013 0.0004 0.0017 0.0034 0.0048 0.0025 
Ghana 0.0004 0.0011 0.0244 0.0259 0.0223 0.0055 
Guinea 0.0015 0.0010 0.0101 0.0126 0.0062 0.0089 
Guinea Bissau 0.0021 0.0005 0.0036 0.0062 0.1885 0.2229 
Mali 0.0011 0.0009 0.0007 0.0028 0.0549 0.0530 
Niger 0.0009 0.0013 0.0001 0.0023 0.0732 0.0574 
Nigeria 0.0023 0.0024 0.0110 0.0156 0.0023 0.0169 
Senegal 0.0013 0.0005 0.0015 0.0034 0.2690 0.1828 
Sierra Leone 0.0061 0.0011 0.0017 0.0089 0.1216 0.1236 
Togo 0.0029 0.0014 0.0054 0.0096 0.2768 0.0867 
Average 0.0018 0.0010 0.0048 
 
0.0882 0.0963 
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Gambia (0.25%), Ghana (0.54%), Guinea (0.89%) and Nigeria (1.69%) respectively. 
The results indicate that the average supply shock cutting across ECOWAS appear to be 
smaller than the average demand and monetary shocks with values 0.76%, 8.8% and 
9.6% respectively. 
Comparatively the average sizes of the disturbances are larger than the already 
established sizes for other monetary regions. For example, the average supply sizes for 
the following: Americas (0.06%), Western Europe (0.03%), East Asia (0.032%), 
SAARC (0.023%). The average demand sizes of demand shocks from other regions are: 
Americas (0.145%), Western Europe (0.022%), East Asia (0.44%) and SAAR (0.037%) 
(see Chuku, 2012). Thus, the absolute relative sizes of the different shocks across West 
Africa are high, indicating that the fixed exchange rate as a common stabilization will 
not address the macroeconomic disturbances of respective ECOWAS economies. 
Discussion of results 
One of the key issues highlighted in the optimum currency area theory clearly 
spelt out by Mundell (1961) is that a group of countries opting for a monetary union 
should not be hit by asymmetric shocks. The findings of this study reveal that the 
responses to changes in external shocks by ECOAWS countries are symmetric. The 
findings are similar to that of Allegret Sand-Zantman (2007) for the case Mercosur 
countries.  
Just like Addison et al. (2005); Houssa (2008); Chuku (2012) and Ekong and 
Onye (2012), the findings of this study reveal that the demand, supply, monetary and 
shocks are among ECOWAS countries are asymmetric. Studies similar to the above 
findings: Ramos and Suriach (2004); Frenkel and Nickel (2002); Broz (2008) and 
Marinas (2012). Ramos and Suriach (2004) found that the enlargement of the EMU 
would require a costly process because they have idiosyncratic shocks. Kar (2011) 
argued that shocks across EU countries are different due to low labor productivity, lack 
of competitiveness, illicit flow of capital etc. On the contrary, the asymmetry of shocks 
across ECOAWS is characterized by weak inter-demand relationships among 
ECOWAS economies, low immobility of factors of production, non-diversification of 
their economies etc.   
Though the findings of Sato, Zhang and McAlee (2005); Ling (2001); Tang, 
(2006); Jeon and Zhang (2007) among others Huang and Guo (2006); Koh and Lee 
(2010) etc suggest that a fully-fledged currency union in East Asia is not necessary, they 
however established that smaller sub-groupings could possibly form a monetary union. 
Their findings are analogous to this study because only WAEMU sub-set economies 
displayed similar responses to economic shocks. Therefore, smaller sub-regional 
groupings tend to validate the OCA theory as also evidenced in the work (Bayoumi & 
Eichengreen, 1994) who submitted that currency unions are only feasible among 
clusters of regional blocs in East Asia. Lastly, the sizes of the shocks are bigger and 
differ from that of other studies due to the time frame of the study as well as the 
inclusion of the oil price variable in the estimation model. 
 
CONCLUSIONS  
This study evaluated the preparedness of ECOWAS towards a single currency 
by analysing the degree of symmetry and sizes of the identified shocks across member 
countries. The analysis was situated within the framework of the OCA theory. The 
SVAR was employed on secondary data from 1975 to 2015. The findings reveal that 
external supply shocks across ECOWAS countries are positive and symmetric except 
for Sierra Leone. This implies that the adoption of a single currency with a common 
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stabilization policy by all ECOWAS countries with the exception of Sierra Leone will 
greatly reduce bilateral exchange rate distortions caused by external disturbances, hence 
making them fit for a monetary union. However, the sizes of the shocks vary (higher for 
smaller economies and lower for larger economies) which might become asymmetric in 
the long run. 
Secondly, domestic supply, monetary and demand shocks are asymmetric 
implying that ECOWAS countries for now require different adjustment policies because 
the potentials for symmetric adjustments within the context of a monetary union are not 
feasible. Thirdly, the absolute relative sizes of the different shocks across ECOWAS 
countries are high and different in sizes. The different relative sizes of the shocks 
indicate that adopting the fixed exchange rate as a common stabilization policy will not 
address the macroeconomic disturbances of respective ECOWAS economies. The 
recommendations that ensue from the findings are as follows: 
ECOWAS governments should search their beam light on policies that will 
facilitate the diversification of their exports. The birth and re-birth of new quality 
products predicated on diversification will increase the export capacity of respective 
economies, reduce the rate of import demand across West Africa and strengthen the 
weak inter-demand relationships among ECOWAS economies which will in turn reduce 
the variability of demand shocks across ECOWAS economies.  
Since factor mobility is an important perquisite entry condition to forming a 
currency union, ECOWAS countries need to relax policies that restrain factor mobility, 
payment of high custom duties and transit charges, high tariffs and delay in the process 
of documentation and requirements for product registration. Also, the governments need 
to improve and expand the network infrastructure across the entire region. All these will 
encourage the fast flow of capital from stronger economies to weaker economies across 
the region making the entire region to adjust faster and evenly to shocks. Secondly, the 
regulatory laws guiding the labour markets across West Africa need to be harmonized 
and made flexible. This will encourage labour mobility, easy resolution of labour 
conflicts, provide incentives for higher labour participation and foster better working 
conditions.   
Thirdly, ECOWAS governments need to strengthen the intra-regional trade links 
among member countries by re-enforcing the already existing trade Treaties, ensuring 
that all trade barriers across the region are abolished. All these will increase the trade 
volume of respective economies and fast-track the creation of the expected common 
market that will greatly minimize the degree of macroeconomic disturbances across 
West Africa.  However, governments of ECOWAS countries need to enforce the laws 
that govern cross-border transactions and put stringent measures to deter illegal trade 
transactions of goods and services across the entire region. This is because illegal trade 
is highly associated with macroeconomic disturbance and policy inconsistency.  
The of asymmetry and different sizes of shocks among ECOWAS underscores 
the need for ECOWAS governments to  further shift the targeted date beyond 2020 to 
create ample time for member countries to get fully prepared. Most importantly, 
WAEMU sub-set economies display similarity in the identified shocks, implying that 
English speaking West Africa countries (WAMZ) should be compelled to first of all 
form a second monetary union in the region. This will make them to fully understand 
the dynamics of how a common stabilization policy can reduce the variability of 
macroeconomic disturbances among member countries and how a one-size-fit all 
exchange rate policy facilitates economic and trade activities. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1. Unit Root Test Result 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) Test            Phillips Perron (PP) Test 
Trend and Intercept. Test Critical Values  1% = -4.2050; 5% = -3.5298; 10% = -3.1946 
Series Levels 1
st
 Difference Levels 1
st
 Difference Order 
Benin    
     WOP -1.869 -5.547 -1.874 -5.572 (I) 
GGDP -2.351 -4.886 -2.443 -4.895 (I) 
DGDP -2.902 -7.240 -2.908 -7.212 (I) 
REER -1.886 -6.555 -1.929 -6.554 (I) 
INF -2.539 -9.054 -2.559 -8.935 (I) 
Cape Verde 
    DGDP -1.471 -4.211 -1.966 -4.699 (I)
REER -1.349 -5.291 -1.345 -5.339 (I) 
INF -3.171 -7.716 -3.177 -7.547 (I) 
Gambia 
     DGDP -1.245 -7.026 -1.383 -7.498 (I)
REER -2.684 -6.576 -2.694 -6.570 (I) 
INF -3.241 -8.304 -3.231 -8.240 (I) 
Guinea 
     DGDP -1.410 -8.477 -1.419 -8.105 (I)
REER -2.221 -8.735 -2.223 -5.944 (I) 
INF -2.878 -7.727 -2.888 -7.727 (I) 
Mali 
     DGDP -3.045 -4.592 -3.045 -7.646 (I)
REER -2.059 -7.235 -2.068 -7.233 (I) 
INF -3.322 -6.832 -11.232 -7.727 (I) 
Nigeria 
     DGDP -1.215 -4.687 -1.267 -4.687 (I)
REER -2.696 -4.803 -2.917 -4.813 (I) 
INF -3.359 -6.515 -3.424 -6.860 (I) 
Seirra Leone 
    DGDP -2.410 -3.481 -4.015 correlogram (I)
REER -2.433 -5.757 -2.437 -6.214 (I) 
INF -3.391 -6.854 -3.413 8.309 (I) 
Burkina Faso  
    DGDP -1.349 -6.177 -1.413 -6.179 (I) 
REER -2.025 -7.215 -2.025 -7.252 (I) 
INF -2.315 -8.114 -3.412 -11.298 (I) 
Cote D'Ivoire 
    DGDP -2.011 -4.904 -2.262 -4.974 (I)
REER -2.579 -6.546 -2.590 -6.546 (I) 
INF -3.134 -0.723 3.151 -8.208 (I) 
GHANA 
     DGDP -1.498 -4.393 -2.141 -4.443 (I)
REER -2.326 -3.807 -2.688 -4.203 (I) 
INF -3.126 -11.244 -3.134 -11.000 (I) 
Guinea Bissau 
    DGDP -3.049 -8.294 -3.092 -8.250 (I)
REER -1.887 -4.177 -1.887 -5.247 (I) 
INF -2.275 -2.174 -2.787 -9.405 (I) 
Niger 
     DGDP -0.386 -6.043 -0.465 -6.049 (I)
REER -1.668 -6.553 -1.677 -6.540 (I) 
INF -3.212 -8.449 -3.132 -8.248 (I) 
Senegal 
     DGDP -2.026 -7.938 -2.085 -7.753 (I)
REER -2.149 -6.621 -2.160 -6.614 (I) 
INF -6.654 Correlogram -6.554 correlogram (I) 
Togo 
     DGDP -1.607 -5.324 -1.634 -5.325 (I)
REER -1.932 -7.288 -1.941 -7.284 (I) 
INF -3.415 -6.464 -3.422 -8.855 (I) 
Source: Author‟s computation using Eviews 9.5  
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Appendix 2. SVAR lag length selection criteria/serial correlationtest 
Country 
 
Lag Length LM - Test 
 Benin 
 
1 
 
21.34(0.6737) 
Burkina Faso 1 
 
26.54(0.6068) 
Cape verde 2 
 
7.89(0.99000) 
Cote D'Ivoire 2 
 
22.59(0.6014) 
Gambia 
 
2 
 
34.06(0.1066) 
Guinea 
 
1 
 
25.03(0.4609) 
Guinea Bissau 1 
 
26.2390.3956) 
Ghana 
 
3 
 
19.91(0.7515) 
Mali 
 
3 
 
23.05(0.5673) 
Niger 
 
1 
 
26.55(0.3785) 
Nigeria 
 
2 
 
13.76(0.9657) 
Senegal 
 
2 
 
26.37(0.3879) 
Sierra Leone 3 
 
22.98(0.6079) 
Togo 
 
1 
 
35.09(0.0865) 
(*) represent the probability Values of the LM test 
Source: Author‟s computation using Eviews 9.5  
 
Appendix 3. Eigen value stability test 
                                                                                             
 
Source: Author‟s computation using Eviews 9.5  
Eigen Value Modulus Eigen Value Modulus Eigen Value Modulus Eigen Value Modulus
Benin Guinea Ghana Sierra Leone
 0.554278 + 0.353482i 0.657399 -0.042733 - 0.754932i 0.75614  0.007801 + 0.711052i 0.7111 -0.016393 - 0.750291i 0.75047
 0.554278 - 0.353482i 0.657399 -0.042733 + 0.754932i 0.75614  0.007801 - 0.711052i 0.7111 -0.016393 + 0.750291i 0.75047
 0.119947 + 0.566748i 0.579302  0.567346 + 0.311451i 0.64721 0.694142 0.6941  0.547701 - 0.416176i 0.68788
 0.119947 - 0.566748i 0.579302  0.567346 - 0.311451i 0.64721 -0.586702 - 0.160775i 0.6083  0.547701 + 0.416176i 0.68788
-0.539103 0.539103 -0.367462 + 0.488236i 0.61107 -0.586702 + 0.160775i 0.6083  0.336884 - 0.494706i 0.598519
-0.202457 + 0.474957i 0.516307 -0.367462 - 0.488236i 0.61107  0.495932 - 0.276168i 0.5676  0.336884 + 0.494706i 0.598519
-0.202457 - 0.474957i 0.516307  0.078410 - 0.563875i 0.5693  0.495932 + 0.276168i 0.5676 -0.39503 0.39503
-0.422600 + 0.135493i 0.44379  0.078410 + 0.563875i 0.5693 -0.063931 + 0.224422i 0.2334 -0.182078 - 0.340505i 0.38613
-0.422600 - 0.135493i 0.44379 -0.328337 0.32834 -0.063931 - 0.224422i 0.2334 -0.182078 + 0.340505i 0.38613
0.0542 0.0542 -0.242868 0.24287 0.202611 0.2026 0.234024 0.234024
Burkina Faso Guinea Bissau Togo Nigeria
-0.343063 - 0.454031i 0.569067 -0.010830 + 0.631864i 0.63196  0.083682 + 0.720029i 0.7249  0.808062 + 0.308190i 0.864839
-0.343063 + 0.454031i 0.569067 -0.010830 - 0.631864i 0.63196  0.083682 - 0.720029i 0.7249  0.808062 - 0.308190i 0.864839
0.519176 0.519176 -0.200146 - 0.576269i 0.61004  0.549376 + 0.261341i 0.6084  0.560399 + 0.607904i 0.826798
 0.065931 - 0.512600i 0.516822 -0.200146 + 0.576269i 0.61004  0.549376 - 0.261341i 0.6084  0.560399 - 0.607904i 0.826798
 0.065931 + 0.512600i 0.516822 -0.599737 0.59974 -0.521351 - 0.123648i 0.5358 -0.189669 + 0.804581i 0.826635
-0.222273 - 0.458397i 0.509444  0.403724 - 0.385867i 0.55847 -0.521351 + 0.123648i 0.5358 -0.189669 - 0.804581i 0.826635
-0.222273 + 0.458397i 0.509444  0.403724 + 0.385867i 0.55847 -0.166271 - 0.482588i 0.5104 -0.567353 + 0.567183i 0.802238
 0.311860 - 0.391729i 0.500708 -0.201655 0.20166 -0.166271 + 0.482588i 0.5104 -0.567353 - 0.567183i 0.802238
 0.311860 + 0.391729i 0.500708  0.024226 + 0.171096i 0.1728 -0.006645 + 0.283191i 0.2833  0.255006 + 0.733190i 0.77627
-0.341224 0.341224  0.024226 - 0.171096i 0.1728 -0.006645 - 0.283191i 0.2833  0.255006 - 0.733190i 0.77627
Cape verde Mali Gambia Senegal
-0.693945 + 0.313852i 0.761618 -0.144745 + 0.773233i 0.78666 -0.136608 + 0.641655i 0.656 -0.379520 - 0.490034i 0.619813
-0.693945 - 0.313852i 0.761618 -0.144745 - 0.773233i 0.78666 -0.136608 - 0.641655i 0.656 -0.379520 + 0.490034i 0.619813
 0.319485 + 0.656406i 0.730027 -0.432826 + 0.498445i 0.66014 -0.579897 + 0.247470i 0.6305 0.609 0.609
 0.319485 - 0.656406i 0.730027 -0.432826 - 0.498445i 0.66014 -0.579897 - 0.247470i 0.6305  0.158809 + 0.564269i 0.586191
0.667121 0.667121  0.061592 - 0.462672i 0.46675  0.358816 - 0.424664i 0.556  0.158809 - 0.564269i 0.586191
-0.108838 - 0.613419i 0.623  0.061592 + 0.462672i 0.46675  0.358816 + 0.424664i 0.556 -0.039477 - 0.497978i 0.49954
-0.108838 + 0.613419i 0.623  0.344943 + 0.261037i 0.43258  0.153256 - 0.365128i 0.396 -0.039477 + 0.497978i 0.49954
-0.612532 0.612532  0.344943 - 0.261037i 0.43258  0.153256 + 0.365128i 0.396 -0.271949 0.271949
 0.232740 - 0.144067i 0.273721 -0.36128 0.36128  0.019941 + 0.160729i 0.162 -0.013770 + 0.091512i 0.092542
 0.232740 + 0.144067i 0.273721 -0.056964 0.05696  0.019941 - 0.160729i 0.162 -0.013770 - 0.091512i 0.092542
Cote D’Ivoire Niger
-0.544820 + 0.462679i 0.714773  0.012491 + 0.686613i 0.68673
-0.544820 - 0.462679i 0.714773  0.012491 - 0.686613i 0.68673
 0.129163 + 0.632396i 0.645452  0.615408 + 0.165390i 0.63725
 0.129163 - 0.632396i 0.645452  0.615408 - 0.165390i 0.63725
 0.491089 - 0.227585i 0.541261 -0.418547 - 0.384687i 0.56848
 0.491089 + 0.227585i 0.541261 -0.418547 + 0.384687i 0.56848
-0.112022 + 0.446895i 0.460721 -0.103397 + 0.461391i 0.47284
-0.112022 - 0.446895i 0.460721 -0.103397 - 0.461391i 0.47284
0.418008 0.418008 -0.46545 0.46545
-0.20296 0.20296 -0.214183 0.21418
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Appendix 4. Correlations of external supply shocks (world oil price) 1975 to 2015 
 
Correlation coefficients are in bold, while t-values are un-bold and the value of 2.0 and above indicates the 
significance of the coefficient at 5%. Positive and statistically significant correlation coefficient indicates symmetry, 
while negative shows asymmetry.  
Source: Author‟s computation using Eviews 9.5  
 
 
Appendix 5. Correlations of external supply shocks (Global GDP) 1975 to 2015 
 
Source: Author‟s computation using Eviews 9.5  
BENIN BURKINA CAPE COTED GAMBIA GHANA GUINEA GBISSAU NIGER MALI NIGERIA SENEG SIERRA TOGO 
BENIN 1.0000
----- 
BURKINA 0.7273 1.0000
t-value 2.9973 ----- 
CAPE 0.8797 0.9546 1.0000
t-value 5.2322 9.0655 ----- 
COTED 0.9785 0.8467 0.9576 1.0000
t-value 13.4303 4.5010 9.3971 ----- 
GAMBIA 0.6435 0.9892 0.9192 0.7839 1.0000
t-value 2.3781 19.0855 6.6037 3.5715 ----- 
GHANA 0.6532 0.9922 0.9200 0.7858 0.9889 1.0000
t-value 2.4399 22.4804 6.6390 3.5933 18.7916 ----- 
GUINEA 0.7866 0.9622 0.9289 0.8703 0.9279 0.9528 1.0000
t-value 3.6030 9.9968 7.0953 4.9977 7.0416 8.8747 ----- 
GBISSAU 0.9250 0.9270 0.9918 0.9832 0.8837 0.8803 0.9226 1.0000
t-value 6.8879 6.9914 21.9386 15.2171 5.3392 5.2488 6.7664 ----- 
NIGER 0.6085 0.9849 0.8927 0.7504 0.9949 0.9918 0.9358 0.8556 1.0000
t-value 2.1689 16.1099 5.6037 3.2113 27.8813 21.9451 7.5051 4.6744 ----- 
MALI 0.6742 0.9285 0.9285 0.8073 0.9423 0.9115 0.8164 0.8895 0.9053 1.0000
t-value 2.5823 7.0727 7.0741 3.8694 7.9577 6.2700 3.9982 5.5054 6.0280 ----- 
NIGERIA 0.8309 0.7930 0.8062 0.8459 0.7282 0.7497 0.8822 0.8438 0.7429 0.5882 1.0000
t-value 4.2242 3.6814 3.8545 4.4866 3.0051 3.2045 5.2986 4.4478 3.1388 2.0573 ----- 
SENEG 0.9668 0.8752 0.9614 0.9942 0.8123 0.8177 0.9037 0.9861 0.7877 0.8050 0.8853 1.0000
t-value 10.6984 5.1167 9.8794 26.0952 3.9394 4.0175 5.9713 16.8090 3.6163 3.8378 5.3842 ----- 
SIERRA 0.7791 0.9895 0.9587 0.8788 0.9639 0.9705 0.9679 0.9432 0.9626 0.8911 0.8549 0.9116 1.0000
t-value 3.5151 19.3568 9.5298 5.2089 10.2438 11.3816 10.8949 8.0330 10.0541 5.5548 4.6611 6.2740 ----- 
TOGO 0.6521 0.9931 0.9258 0.7883 0.9935 0.9983 0.9396 0.8846 0.9919 0.9320 0.7321 0.8172 0.9695 1.0000
t-value 2.4329 23.9714 6.9272 3.6233 24.6694 48.2499 7.7637 5.3637 22.1215 7.2705 3.0402 4.0100 11.1904 ----- 
BENIN BURKINA CAPEV COTED GAMBIA GHANA GUINEA GUINEAB MALI NIGER NIGERIA SENEGAL SIERRAL TOGO 
BENIN 1.0000
----- 
BURKINA 0.9599 1.0000
t-value 9.6879 ----- 
CAPEV 0.7083 0.8184 1.0000
t-value 2.8381 4.0289 ----- 
COTED 0.9603 0.9868 0.8702 1.0000
t-value 9.7410 17.2572 4.9960 ----- 
GAMBIA 0.8593 0.9538 0.9367 0.9638 1.0000
t-value 4.7520 8.9822 7.5694 10.2237 ----- 
GHANA 0.9514 0.9808 0.7033 0.9455 0.8987 1.0000
t-value 8.7428 14.2254 2.7982 8.2139 5.7970 ----- 
GUINEA 0.9951 0.9520 0.7354 0.9613 0.8604 0.9272 1.0000
t-value 28.5382 8.7964 3.0698 9.8727 4.7761 7.0010 ----- 
GUINEAB 0.9728 0.8797 0.5392 0.8716 0.7191 0.8942 0.9661 1.0000
t-value 11.8800 5.2328 1.8107 5.0279 2.9273 5.6484 10.5804 ----- 
MALI 0.9667 0.9803 0.8529 0.9925 0.9481 0.9361 0.9729 0.8877 1.0000
t-value 10.6833 14.0289 4.6201 22.9519 8.4296 7.5246 11.9005 5.4532 ----- 
NIGER 0.9835 0.9136 0.5749 0.8984 0.7631 0.9310 0.9719 0.9956 0.9088 1.0000
t-value 15.3722 6.3543 1.9872 5.7857 3.3393 7.2120 11.6788 30.1065 6.1610 ----- 
NIGERIA 0.7191 0.6904 0.3400 0.6195 0.5518 0.7206 0.7214 0.7443 0.6773 0.7469 1.0000
t-value 2.9267 2.6993 1.0224 2.2324 1.8716 2.9398 2.9462 3.1518 2.6042 3.1768 ----- 
SENEGAL 0.7596 0.7438 0.2540 0.6569 0.5713 0.8593 0.6993 0.7829 0.6470 0.8166 0.6883 1.0000
t-value 3.3030 3.1476 0.7427 2.4641 1.9686 4.7529 2.7667 3.5593 2.3998 4.0008 2.6840 ----- 
SIERRAL -0.7476 -0.6175 -0.1036 -0.5679 -0.3706 -0.7183 -0.7048 -0.8529 -0.5649 -0.8478 -0.5580 -0.8656 1.0000
t-value -3.1842 -2.2205 -0.2947 -1.9513 -1.1285 -2.9203 -2.8104 -4.6202 -1.9363 -4.5226 -1.9021 -4.8901 ----- 
TOGO 0.8310 0.8934 0.9782 0.9425 0.9560 0.7937 0.8553 0.6969 0.9325 0.7226 0.4448 0.3758 -0.2871 1.0000
t-value 4.2258 5.6242 13.3161 7.9781 9.2115 3.6901 4.6690 2.7483 7.3021 2.9565 1.4047 1.1471 -0.8477 ----- 
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Appendix 6. Correlations of domestic supply shocks (GDP), 1975 to 2015 
 
Source: Author‟s computation using Eviews 9.5  
Appendix 7. Correlations of demand shocks (domestic price), 1975 to 2015 
 
Source: Author‟s computation using Eviews 9.5  
BENIN BURKINA CAPEV COTED GAMBIA GHANA GUINEA GUINEAB MALI NIGER NIGERIA SENEGAL SIERRAL TOGO 
BENIN 1
----- 
BURKINA 0.6409 1
t-value 2.36151 ----- 
CAPEV -0.783 -0.951837 1
t-value -3.56089 -8.780689 ----- 
COTED 0.9842 0.56907 -0.6995 1
t-value 15.72263 1.957431 -2.768757 ----- 
GAMBIA 0.7207 0.978952 -0.933 0.67952 1
t-value 2.940688 13.56691 -7.333502 2.61973 ----- 
GHANA 0.4699 0.834041 -0.6711 0.46617 0.87853 1
t-value 1.505761 4.275897 -2.560014 1.490379 5.201927 ----- 
GUINEA 0.7318 0.986916 -0.9766 0.65376 0.96943 0.79562 1
t-value 3.036854 17.31275 -12.85361 2.443631 11.17516 3.714749 ----- 
GUINEAB -0.967 -0.432121 0.62659 -0.9635 -0.52188 -0.2469 -0.54598 1
t-value -10.71 -1.35529 2.27401 -10.17895 -1.73043 -0.720534 -1.84324 ----- 
MALI 0.7462 0.866901 -0.8055 0.74317 0.94114 0.93129 0.8697 -0.566377 1
t-value 3.170505 4.918874 -3.844101 3.141534 7.875309 7.231024 4.983788 -1.943778 ----- 
NIGER 0.915 0.823068 -0.8586 0.90294 0.90446 0.764 0.86307 -0.790476 0.9441 1
t-value 6.412984 4.098985 -4.737884 5.942387 5.997407 3.349119 4.833144 -3.650331 8.099313 ----- 
NIGERIA 0.9724 0.684648 -0.7759 0.98286 0.78924 0.59431 0.74665 -0.908349 0.8377 0.9602 1
t-value 11.78937 2.656808 -3.478245 15.08086 3.635129 2.090117 3.174661 -6.143297 4.339003 9.723467 ----- 
SENEGAL 0.885 0.888482 -0.9058 0.8682 0.95302 0.79234 0.91366 -0.741051 0.9462 0.9834 0.937819 1
t-value 5.376548 5.476025 -6.047488 4.948676 8.898653 3.673407 6.357536 -3.121626 8.270008 15.34711 7.641483 ----- 
SIERRAL 0.6717 0.311269 -0.3065 0.75074 0.47637 0.59744 0.36577 -0.636499 0.7314 0.731 0.746475 0.642903 1
t-value 2.564797 0.926426 -0.910814 3.214365 1.532407 2.107203 1.111594 -2.334169 3.033292 3.0304 3.172986 2.374057 ----- 
TOGO 0.9637 0.443217 -0.6462 0.94914 0.52012 0.22199 0.55922 -0.997384 0.5438 0.777 0.893261 0.732019 0.58472 1
t-value 10.2025 1.39847 -2.395114 8.525989 1.722421 0.643933 1.907907 -39.02583 1.832844 3.491043 5.620264 3.039058 2.038664 ----- 
BENIN BURKINA CAPEV COTED GAMBIA GHANA GUINEA GUINEAB MALI NIGER NIGERIA SENEGAL SIERRAL TOGO 
BENIN 1
----- 
BURKINAF 0.4259 1
t-value 1.331239 ----- 
CAPEV -0.441 -0.74548 1
t-value -1.38887 -3.163461 ----- 
COTED 0.2045 0.5778 -0.1141 1
t-value 0.59102 2.002336 -0.32484 ----- 
GAMBIA 0.8834 0.408669 -0.2958 0.55708 1
t-value 5.333044 1.266477 -0.875975 1.89734 ----- 
GHANA 0.5187 0.96293 -0.852 0.36727 0.390198 1
t-value 1.71581 10.09668 -4.603416 1.11683 1.198663 ----- 
GUINEA 0.1283 0.848495 -0.3657 0.85367 0.330098 0.67456 1
t-value 0.365817 4.534937 -1.111218 4.636173 0.989102 2.584503 ----- 
GUINEAB 0.2719 0.876289 -0.4329 0.87829 0.472605 0.71822 0.986548 1
t-value 0.799257 5.144435 -1.358228 5.195669 1.516812 2.919476 17.06962 ----- 
MALI 0.546 0.915107 -0.8009 0.24341 0.340895 0.98027 0.583313 0.621934 1
t-value 1.843189 6.419252 -3.782827 0.70983 1.025629 14.02746 2.031226 2.24641 ----- 
NIGER 0.3939 0.968678 -0.6324 0.76172 0.490721 0.87536 0.932337 0.962016 0.797 1
t-value 1.212247 11.03347 -2.309133 3.32528 1.592956 5.121171 7.292929 9.967192 3.732348 ----- 
NIGERIA 0.3972 0.582271 -0.2343 0.94921 0.721487 0.42393 0.752807 0.818254 0.2946 0.7519 1
t-value 1.224127 2.025732 -0.68181 8.53257 2.947128 1.323892 3.234769 4.025996 0.871808 3.225874 ----- 
SENEGAL 0.5923 0.978334 -0.7809 0.57634 0.571357 0.96324 0.783415 0.843879 0.9147 0.9508 0.630047 1
t-value 2.079349 13.36569 -3.535451 1.994741 1.969099 10.14106 3.565305 4.448648 6.402007 8.683291 2.2948 ----- 
SIERRAL -0.102 0.281825 0.0466 0.90043 0.3498 0.05362 0.661233 0.666917 -0.111 0.5026 0.84959 0.266438 1
t-value -0.28911 0.830796 0.131862 5.854828 1.056103 0.151891 2.493065 2.531533 -0.31557 1.64436 4.555937 0.781864 ----- 
TOGO 0.5411 0.976795 -0.8337 0.44705 0.450709 0.99571 0.71957 0.768466 0.9649 0.9106 0.504699 0.983025 0.134763 1
t-value 1.820017 12.89954 -4.269404 1.413546 1.428071 30.4486 2.930862 3.396757 10.39589 6.230975 1.653551 15.15432 0.384677 ----- 
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Appendix  8. Correlations of monetary shocks (REER), 1975 to 2015 
 
Source: Author‟s computation using Eviews 9.5  
 
BENIN BURKINA CAPEV COTED GAMBIA GUINEA GHANA GUINEAB MALI NIGER NIGERIA SENEGAL SIERRAL TOGO 
BENIN 1
----- 
BURKINA -0.335 1
t-value -1.00529 ----- 
CAPEV -0.086 -0.897662 1
t-value -0.24332 -5.761431 ----- 
COTED 0.7685 -0.834466 0.51593 1
t-value 3.396628 -4.283065 1.703496 ----- 
GAMBIA 0.7165 -0.639715 0.27834 0.85306 1
t-value 2.904711 -2.354096 0.819648 4.623916 ----- 
GUINEA 0.202 -0.965862 0.88978 0.75248 0.67264 1
t-value 0.583482 -10.54541 5.51429 3.231531 2.571094 ----- 
GHANA 0.6015 -0.740293 0.44054 0.82478 0.9608 0.786387 1
t-value 2.129681 -3.11455 1.387996 4.125594 9.801706 3.600641 ----- 
GUINEAB -0.915 0.244899 0.20099 -0.69161 -0.84429 -0.210256 -0.72668 1
t-value -6.40845 0.714434 0.58034 -2.708375 -4.456211 -0.60829 -2.991893 ----- 
MALI -0.333 0.946562 -0.8011 -0.84267 -0.76884 -0.970971 -0.8188 0.347759 1
t-value -0.99941 8.30107 -3.786343 -4.42662 -3.400804 -11.48134 -4.034141 1.049092 ----- 
NIGER -0.387 0.976911 -0.8222 -0.88244 -0.74518 -0.967155 -0.804932 0.354467 0.9877 1
t-value -1.18864 12.93303 -4.085873 -5.305544 -3.160623 -10.76185 -3.836902 1.072205 17.88836 ----- 
NIGERIA -0.365 -0.245627 0.51617 -0.11064 -0.54036 0.120067 -0.374888 0.653661 0.0289 -0.075 1
t-value -1.10724 -0.716695 1.704597 -0.314861 -1.816394 0.342074 -1.143757 2.442998 0.081647 -0.21338 ----- 
SENEGAL -0.708 0.8303 -0.5127 -0.9567 -0.95131 -0.814022 -0.949299 0.731582 0.8846 0.8918 0.269984 1
t-value -2.83793 4.213845 -1.68913 -9.296617 -8.729785 -3.963958 -8.540838 3.035152 5.364164 5.575655 0.793082 ----- 
SIERRAL 0.6784 -0.912735 0.64254 0.97369 0.85008 0.853225 0.879022 -0.613619 -0.896 -0.932 -0.039648 -0.970308 1
t-value 2.611853 -6.318899 2.371782 12.086 4.565428 4.627196 5.214643 -2.198041 -5.71876 -7.25197 -0.11223 -11.34674 ----- 
TOGO 0.8437 -0.783215 0.43942 0.98717 0.85835 0.687201 0.829495 -0.757194 -0.773 -0.82 -0.142678 -0.949201 0.963918 1
t-value 4.446076 -3.562952 1.383611 17.48487 4.731863 2.67555 4.200735 -3.278784 -3.44827 -4.04982 -0.407727 -8.531886 10.24184 ----- 
